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1. Introduction: The Impact of the Syrian 
Civil War 10 Years on 
The conflict in Syria has been ongoing for a decade and the humanitarian needs 
continue to be extraordinarily high. Although guns have fallen relatively silent since 
the ceasefire of March 2020, the threat of renewed hostilities still persists. The 
Syrian government has vowed to regain control over all of Syria and Turkey and 
continues to threaten Kurdish-controlled SDF’s areas, where anger is brewing due to 
oppression against Arab tribes and political opponents. The relative calm on the 
country’s remaining battlefields has not translated into better conditions on the 
ground as the country’s economy continues to deteriorate due to years of conflict, 
mismanagement, displacement and destruction of the infrastructure as well as the 
imposition of increasingly suffocating sanctions by the United States.  
The COVID-19 pandemic combined with the banking crisis in Lebanon have exacerbated the 
country’s economic woes and taken a severe toll on the economy and population. 
Precautionary COVID-19 measures (e.g. closure of border crossings), and loss of billions of 
dollars of Syrian businessmen in Lebanese banks led to an unprecedented devaluation of the 
Syrian pound, and an acute shortage of foreign currency.1 Within five months, the cumulative 
effect of these shocks has led to an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 job losses2 and the 
permanent closure of 15 percent of small and medium businesses. Precautionary COVID-19 
measures and exchange rate volatility have also forced humanitarian actors to either 
temporarily suspend operations and/or redesign their budgets, leading to delays in the delivery 
of life-saving assistance.3 The economic and humanitarian deterioration has been further 
worsened by sanctions.4    
U.S. sanctions, and the EU to a lesser degree, are not only partly responsible for 
hindering the recovery of the economy by targeting investments in strategic sectors 
such as oil, gas, and construction, but they have also complicated the work of 
 
1 Al-Khalidi, Suleiman. (2020). ‘Syria’s Assad says billions locked in troubled Lebanese banks behind economic 
crisis.’ Reuters. 4 November. Accessed 2 March 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/syria-crisis-assad-
deposits-int-idUSKBN27K2W4. 
2 OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Response, Syrian Arab Republic: 2021 Needs and Response Summary, 22 February. 
Accessed on 1 March 2021. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/whole-of-
syria/document/2021-needs-and-response-summary-syrian-arab-republic.  
3 OCHA, 2020. Syrian Arab Republic: Covid-19 Humanitarian Update No. 18, 17 September, 2020. Accessed on 20 
September 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-covid-19-humanitarian-
update-no-18-17-september.  
4 Ghisn, Ziad. (2020). ‘How economic sanctions negatively affect the health sector in Syria: a case study of the 
pharmaceutical industry.’ 16 April. Accessed 19 September 2020.  https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/04/16/how-
economic-sanctions-negatively-affect-the-health-sector-in-syria-a-case-study-of-the-pharmaceutical-industry/.  
Starvation in Syria: A Political Marketplace Analysis 
 
5 
humanitarian organizations, despite the fact that the humanitarian sector is officially 
exempt from the sanctions regime. These sanctions have had a cumulative effect 
on humanitarian operations due to their chilling effects and the difficulties in 
securing waivers to allow aid imports (including for example for education 
purposes)5 and bank transfers.6 Meanwhile, sanctions on oil imports, and threats 
against those that facilitate them, have led to shortages of fuel supplies to the 
country and limiting electricity supplies and fuel for heating, agriculture, and 
industry.7  
The confluence of these factors, among others, have contributed to increased food 
insecurity in the country as well as the increased adaptation of irreversible coping 
strategies,8 such as the selling of properties to support livelihoods, and a spike in 
acute malnutrition levels,9 all of which are happening in a context of a collapsing 
health sector. Approximately 70 percent of qualified health workers have left the 
country and only half of the public hospitals are operating at full capacity.10 
According to the United Nations, the poverty-stricken country, which had previously 
attained a unique position in the Middle East as a self-sufficient and wheat exporting 
country, is at risk of famine,11 and for the first time in its history has introduced a 
limit on bread distribution.12 
The emergence of the humanitarian crisis and its subsequent deepening is, however, 
 
5 Nebehay, Stephanie. (2020). ‘Big powers urged to freeze sanctions on Syria, Iran, Venezuela during virus.’ 
Reuters. 28 April. Accessed 20 September 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-
sanctions-idAFKCN22A2TK. 
6 Daher, Joseph. (2020a). ‘Invisible Sanctions: How over-compliance limits humanitarian work on Syria: 
Challenges of Fund Tranfer for Non-Profit Organizations Working on Syria.’ Impact. Accessed on 19 September 
2020. https://impact-csrd.org/reports/Invisible_Sanctions_IMPACT_EN.pdf.  
7 Al-Khalidi, Suleiman. (2020). ‘Syria says U.S. sanctions behind acute crisis.’ Reuters, 16 September. Accessed on 
20 September 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-fuel-shortages-idUSKBN2673OG;   
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (Undated). ‘Syria Sanctions.’ Accessed on 1 March 2021. 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/syria-
sanctions. 
8 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2020). ‘Syrian Arab Republic Situation Report,’ 
Accessed on 20 September 2020. http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-
detail/en/c/1295916/.  
9 OCHA, (2020). ‘Syrian Arab Republic: Covid-19 Humanitarian Update, No. 18.’ 17 September. Accessed 20 
September 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-covid-19-humanitarian-
update-no-18-17-september. 
10 Gharibah, Mazen and Mehchy, Zaki. (2020). COVID-19 Pandemic: Syria’s Repsonse and Healthcare Capacity. 
Policy Memo. Conflict Research Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103841/. 
11 United Nations News. (2020). ‘As famines of “biblical proportion” loom, Security Council urged to “act fast.”’ 21 
April 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1062272.  
12 Syrian Arab News Agency. (2020). ‘Decisions of Council of Ministers.’ 15 September 2020. Accessed 20 
September 2020. http://www.sana.sy/?p=1219715.  
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is not only the consequence of the conflict and deteriorating economy but also the 
result of the interventions and policies of actors involved in the conflict. Direct 
policies and interventions of conflict actors, some of which will be discussed below, 
have contributed and shaped some of the worst episodes of humanitarian crisis 
throughout the conflict.  
 
Political Marketplace Framework and Analysis  
This paper provides an analysis of starvation in Syria through the prism of the 
Political Marketplace frame (PMF). It assumes a working knowledge of the basic 
principle of the framework13 and while it does not aim to offer policy 
recommendations, it seeks to provide a detailed analysis to inform future policy 
addressing food security in Syria.  
The paper begins by tracing the evolution of the political economy in Syria under the 
Ba’ath Party and Assad Senior, a period in which the country operated as a highly 
centralized authoritarian political system based on patronage (Section 2). The paper 
then proceeds to discuss the first decade of Bashar al-Assad’s reign, a period that 
witnessed a change in the nature of the political system from a highly centralized 
authoritarianism to a centralized kleptocracy. The section further elaborates on the 
main economic and political configuration during this period.  
The following sections focus on how multiple political marketplaces emerged in the 
context of the civil war in Syria (Section 3) and the changing political economy during 
the conflict (Section 4). This is discussed through four phases: political mobilization, 
militarization, civil war, and subsequent shift to a proxy war. During the conflict, the 
political system shifted towards a deregulated form of free competition only to shift 
again into a system that is dominated by rivalrous oligopolies supported by 
international actors.  
The fifth section of the paper provides a political marketplace analysis of the conflict 
and the role of siege warfare and subsequent starvation. The paper argues that the 
humanitarian crisis that resulted from siege warfare was not motivated by a PMF 
logic, but rather a war/military logic. This applies to all actors who deployed the 
strategy. This section also briefly addresses the impact of the conflict on the 
 
13 The Political Marketplace Framework comes from de Waal, Alex. 2015. The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: 
Money, War, and the Business of Power. Cambridge: Polity. For additional work on political marketplace analyses, 
see the Conflict Research Programme at LSE: https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/projects/conflict-research-programme; 
and World Peace Foundation: https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/political-markets-justice-and-security-program/.   
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agricultural sector, including dynamics that impact its recovery, and the subsequent 
impact on the food security of the country.  
The paper concludes with a discussion of the unprecedented level of the 
humanitarian crisis and how urgent action to improve food security in Syria is critical. 
This will require domestic and international actors to pursue policies that depoliticize 
access to food and prioritize the interests of the Syrian people.  
 
2. A History of Syria’s Political Economy 
The current Syrian political system has its roots in the mid-1950s, the short-lived 
Syrian-Egyptian union, and in the early 1960s when the Ba’ath Party took power in 
Syria in a bloodless coup in 1963. The legacies of these periods have shaped the 
evolution of the Syrian state and economy through today. This section will address 
the main characteristics of the Syrian political system and economy in the period 
between 1963 and 2020.  
In the initial years of its reign, the political elite of the Ba’ath pursued radical agendas 
for political, economic, and social transformation under the banner of ‘socialist 
transformation.’14 This entailed large-scale nationalisation, especially in the 
industrial and financial sectors, along with land reforms15  aimed at securing national 
economic independence and food sufficiency.16 The scale and scope of these 
policies, however, was a source of contention between two rivalrous factions within 
the party; a Marxist-leaning and a pragmatist-leaning faction. This rivalry led to 
heightened political competition over power and control, culminating in a ‘duality of 
power’ in the late 1960s. This changed, however, when Hafez al-Assad (Assad 
Senior) assumed control after a bloodless coup in 1970.  
Assad Senior built a highly centralized and patronage-based authoritarian political 
system with the armed forces and coercive apparatuses as its backbone. Assad 
Senior and his regime employed neo-patrimonial strategies and the regime was 
infested with corruption, clientelism, and favouritism.17 In building his regime, Assad 
 
14 Van Dam, Nikolaos. (2017). Destroying a Nation: The Civil War in Syria. I.B. TAURIS, 41.  
15 Abboud, Samer N. (2018). Syria. Second Edition. Policy Press, 33.  
16 Hinnebusch, Raymond. (2011). ‘The Ba’ath Agrarian Revolution (1963-2000)’ in Agriculture and Reform in Syria. 
Hinnebusch, Raymond et al (eds), St. Andrews Papers on Contemporary Syria.  
17 Van Dam 2017, 47. 
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Senior depended on his Alawite co-religionists in a ‘Ba’athized army’18 and linked the 
political system to society through bureaucratic and party-corporatist institutions 
that cut across sectarian and urban-rural divides and spanned the middle class and 
the peasantry.19 The coalition was not static, and, in the face of challenges and 
developments, it expanded to accommodate different constituencies, including the 
former bourgeoisie.  
Notwithstanding the importance of the coercive apparatuses, the Ba’ath Party, the 
bureaucracy, and corporatists organizations, such as women’s and farmers’ unions, 
which were created in top-down initiatives,20 also constituted important pillars for 
the regime. Although the party gradually lost political power, it was coterminous with 
the state and by the mid-1980s the Ba’athist Party’s budget was equivalent to that of 
the Ministry of Finance.21 Members of the Ba’ath Party and leaders of corporatist 
institutions came to constitute the new state-bourgeoisie or a class of state 
functionaries.22 Meanwhile, public sector employment was one of the main 
instruments through which the regime exercised patronage. The sector employed 
major segments of the middle and working classes,23 amounting to 25 percent of 
employed Syrians in the 1980s. 
While patronage was an important pillar of the Assad regime’s power, the backbone 
was its coercive apparatus. In addition to its military missions, the armed forces 
were endowed with the task of participating in economic and social development by 
building up the socio-economic infrastructure.24 The armed forces hence developed 
complex and substantial economic interests, ranging from road infrastructure to 
housing construction at the national level, and became an integral part of the 
economy. Like the party, the military became an important instrument of penetrating 
and integrating society.25 Patrimonialism was prevalent and personalism pervaded 
 
18 Hinnebusch, Raymond and Tina Zintl. (2015). ‘Introduction’ in Syria from Reform to Revolt. Political Economy and 
International Relations. Hinnebusch, Raymond and Rina Zintl (eds), Volume 1. Syracuse University Press., 03. 
19 Hinnebusch, Raymond (2012b). ‘Authoritarian Upgrading and the Arab Uprising: Syria in Comparative 
Perspective’, BRISMES conference, London, March, 06.  
20 Hinnebusch, Raymond. (2005). ‘Political Parties and Trade Unions.’ in A Companion to the History Of The Middle 
East. Choueiri, Youssef M. (ed). Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 349. 
21 Ziadeh, Radwan. (2011). Power and Policy in Syria. Intelligence Services, Foreign Relations and Democracy in the 
Modern Middle East. New York: I. B. Tauris and Co., 13-15.  
22 Perthes, Volker. (1991). ‘The Bourgeoisie and the Baath,’ Middle East Report 170. May/June.  
23 Hinnebusch, Raymond. (2012a). ‘Syria from authoritarian upgrading to revolution?’ International Affairs, No. 1: 
96. 
24 Ali, Mohammad Hussein Al-Haj. (2012). Syrian Arab Army: From Corrective Movement until Now. Accessed 14 
April 2021.  
https://riadi.alwehda.gov.sy/_archive.asp?FileName=89899049520120501005608.   
25 Stacher, Joshua. (2012). Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria. Stanford University Press, 65. 
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staffing decisions.26 Trusted members of the military, and security agencies 
established their own network of social (tribal, sectarian, religious) clients.27  
To maintain support and loyalty among the armed forces and security apparatuses, 
corruption and illicit economic activities of (high-ranking) officers were tolerated by 
the regime.28 By incriminating the inner circle and allowing such criminal behaviour, 
the regime was able to clamp down on any figure that constituted a political or 
security threat. Further, a comprehensive crackdown on these figures, especially on 
high-ranking officers, would have undermined inter-regime power dynamics and 
destabilised the regime. Key officers thus benefited and were involved in a variety of 
contraband activities in Syria and Lebanon. In Syria, these military officers created a 
‘military-mercantile complex’ with the rehabilitated merchants and old bourgeoise 
and benefited from state contracts; while in Lebanon, they openly invested in 
Lebanese industrial, commercial, and service ventures along with Lebanese 
businessmen. This was extremely beneficial during the reconstruction period in the 
mid-1990s.29  
 
Economic and Regional Developments and their Impact on the 
Structure of Assad Senior’s Regime 
The initial years of the reign of Assad Senior coincided with an increase in rents 
driven by the increase in oil prices, technical and financial support from the Soviet 
Union due to superpower competition, and the flow of aid from Gulf states, given 
Syria’s role in the fight against Israel as one of the ‘front line’ states in the region.30 
During the 1970s, GDP per capita (at constant prices) grew at an annual rate of 6 
percent.31 The Assad Senior regime used these rents to expand its military, co-opt 
the middle class, and create a large state bureaucracy.32  This led to what Ayubi33 
 
26 Hinnebusch 2012a, 97. 
27 Saouli, Adham. (2018). ‘The tragedy of Baáthist state building’ in The Syrian Uprising. Domestic Origins and Early 
Trajectory. Hinnebusch, Raymond, and Omar Imady (eds). London: Routledge, 23. 
28 Haddad, Bassam. (2012). Business Networks in Syria. The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience. Stanford 
University Press, 99-100.  
29 Matar, Linda. (2016). The Political Economy of Investment in Syria. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 97-98. 
30 Hinnebusch, Raymond. (2009). ‘Syria under the Ba’th: the political economy of populist authoritarianism’ in 
Hinnebusch, Raymond and Soren Schmidt (eds) The State and the Political Economy of reform in Syria. St 
Andrews Papers on Contemporary Syria. St. Andrews University Press. 
31 Matar 2016, 2. 
32 Hinnebusch, Raymond. (2020a). ‘State, Revolution and War: Conflict and Resilience in MENA’s State and State 
System.’ in The Routledge Handbook to the Middle East and North African State and State System. Hinnebusch, 
Raymond and Jasmine Gani (eds). London: Routledge, 34. 
33 Ayubi, Nazih N. (1996). Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris 
and Co. 
Starvation in Syria: A Political Marketplace Analysis 
 
10 
called an ‘overstating’ of the state or as Hinnebusch34 argues, as the 
overdevelopment of the state relative to its economic base.  
Meanwhile, Assad Senior maintained a political narrative focused on Ba’athist 
ideology. However, in practice, Assad Senior incrementally reversed the policies that 
were introduced in the initial years of the Ba’ath Party. The policies, which had made 
the state directly responsible for capital accumulation and were implemented at the 
cost of private commercial and industrial sectors,35 were indirectly substituted 
through ‘mild loosening of government controls on private economic activity’36 in 
what represented a state-business rapprochement.  
Nonetheless, economic liberalization was slow, limited, and conducted in selective 
and tailored ways according to the ruling elites’ political calculations in order to avoid 
threatening the core political structure.37 Syria remained a middle-income welfare 
state and the stability of the ruling elites, including the stability of the party, security 
sector, and corporate interests, was central to the stability of the country’s political 
economy. Economic instability at home and regional developments were catalysts 
for further liberalization and reorganization of the economic order in Syria.  
From the mid-1970s onward, the country suffered from political unrest and 
witnessed an armed insurgency waged by affiliates of the fighting vanguards of the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement. Violence was sporadic and targeted against 
Ba’athists as well as military and security forces. The authorities responded harshly, 
and violence peaked in 1982 when the city of Hama was attacked. Approximately 
20,000 people were killed, the vast majority of whom were innocent civilians.38 
During the month-long attack, government forces deployed siege tactics (similar to 
those used after 2011) cutting off food and energy supplies, initially to the whole city 
and subsequently to the old city neighbourhood where insurgents had taken 
refuge.39  Instability at home, which further worsened in the early 1980s due to intra-
regime strife over power, was accompanied by shifting regional dynamics emanating 
from the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, Egypt-Israel peace treaty, first Gulf War, 
and the Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of Lebanon in 1982. These 
 
34 Hinnebusch 2012a. 
35 Heydemann, Steven. (1999).  Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946–1970. Cornell 
University Press, 106.  
36 Haddad 2012, 92-93. 
37 Matar 2016, 93. 
38 Van Dam, Nikolaos. (1979). The Struggle for Power in Syria. Politics and Society Under the Ba’th Party. London: 
I.B. Tauris and Co, 111-116. 
39 Seale, Patrick. (1988). Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East. University of California Press, 333. 
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challenges, compounded by the failure of the statists developmental policies and 
decreased rent from the Gulf countries, resulted in an economic crisis in the mid-
1980s.  
The crisis culminated in the fiscal and liquidity crisis of 1986, but the preceding era 
was marked by severe shortages in consumer products, producers’ means of 
production, and raw materials. At this time, smuggling with Lebanon and Turkey was 
rife and black markets flourished.40 Real GDP growth dropped to 1 percent in the late 
1980s41 and inflation increased by approximately 70 percent.42 Consequently, the 
government in Damascus shifted to austerity and a wave of selective economic 
liberalization, nonetheless mediated ones, were introduced and they culminated in 
the introduction of Investment Law Number 10 of 1991.43 This 1991 law opened the 
door to reintegrate the private sector into the economy under the banner of 
‘economic pluralism’, but this limited rearrangement failed to revitalize the Syrian 
economy.  Following the Gulf War in 1991, rents derived from oil and Gulf monarchies 
became the main source of government revenues.44  
 
Father to Son: Assad Junior and the Remaking of Syria’s Economy  
In July 2000, Bashar al-Assad, hereunder Assad Junior, was ‘elected’ as president 
after his father’s death. Assad Junior had no previous history in party politics and 
initially depended on the incumbent elites to rule.45 He had to share power with the 
‘old guards’,46 which resulted in a revival of the Ba’ath Party and of a balance of power 
between the presidency and the party.47 The personal style of rule under Assad 
Senior gave way to a revival of institutions, such as the cabinet. At the time, Assad 
Junior was popular due to his image as a reformer,48 and his ascension to power 
created great expectations of structural reforms.49 This was epitomized by the 
‘Damascus Spring’, a short period in late 2000 and early 2001, during which political 
 
40 Haddad 2012, 93-97. 
41 Matar 2016, 102-103.  
42 Hinnebusch 2011, 7.  
43 Matar 2016, 102-103. 
44 Matar 2016, 15.  
45 Hinnebusch, Raymond. (2015). ‘President and Party in Post-Ba’athist Syria. From the Struggle for Reform to 
Regime Deconstruction’ in Syria from Reform to Revolt. Political Economy and International Relations. Hinnebusch, 
Raymond and Rina Zintl (eds). Volume 1. Syracuse University Press, 26-27.  
46 Hinnebusch 2012a, 98. 
47 Hinnebusch 2015, 26-27.  
48 Lesch, David W. (2005). The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar Al Asad and Modern Syria. Yale University Press.  
49 Pinto, Paulo G. (2015). ‘God and Nation: The Politics of Islam under Bashar al-Asad’ in Syria from Reform to 
Revolt. Political Economy and International Relations. Edited by Hinnebusch, Raymond and Rina Zintl. Volume 1. 
Syracuse University Press, 154. 
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forums and salons flourished, and intellectuals, as well as members of the secular 
and liberal opposition, were permitted to engage in public matters.50  
The first half-decade under Assad Junior was also marked by major regional and 
international developments, including the Global War on Terror and the U.S. 
occupation of Iraq. The latter was considered a first step towards more ‘regime 
change’ in the region and hence it was voraciously opposed by the Syrian 
government. In the years before the occupation of Iraq, the importance of Iraq, as an 
economic partner and a destination for Syrian goods, had grown. In the early 2000s, 
Syria allowed Iraq to smuggle oil through the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline in violation of 
international sanctions. This was lucrative for Syria, which benefited from the returns 
of Iraqi oil and in return exported its goods to Iraq. Associates of the Syrian regime 
were among the main beneficiaries. In March 2003, Assad Junior declared that Iraq 
War would be met with resistance. In the years that followed, Syria hosted 
approximately two million Iraqi refugees as well as members of the Iraqi opposition. 
The US responded to Syria’s actions with sanctions and political pressure applied 
through Congressional acts and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 
in 2003 and 2004.51 In February 2005, pressure on the country mounted further as 
the Syrian government was accused of assassinating the Lebanese prime minister, 
Rafiq al-Hariri. Subsequently, on 26 April 2005, the last Syrian troops withdrew from 
Lebanon, a historical sphere of Syrian influence and the lung through which the 
Syrian economy breathed.52  Lebanon played a very important role in the facilitation 
of Syrian businesses due to sanctions on the Syrian economy and banking system. 
It also represented a market for low-skilled Syrians. Notwithstanding the withdrawal, 
strong economic links persisted between the two countries as they had been 
codified in the ‘Fraternity, Friendship, and Cooperation’ treaty.  
These national and regional developments, combined with socio-economic 
grievances resulting from rapid population growth, rural-urban migration, dwindling 
oil resources,53 widespread discontent in the party bases and society at the 
 
50 Al-Om, Tamara. (2018). ‘Emergence of the political voice of Syria’s civil society: The non-violent movements of 
the Syrian Uprising’ in The Syrian Uprising. Domestic Origins and Early Trajectory. Edited by Hinnebusch, Raymond 
and Omar Imady. London: Routledge, 159-160.  
51 Scheller, Bente. (2013). The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game: Foreign Policy under the Assads. London: Hurst and 
Company, 121-149.  
52 Matar 2016, 97. 
53 Zintel, Tina. (2015). ‘The Co-option of Foreign-Educated Syrians: Between Legitimizing Strategy and Domestic 
Reforms’ in Syria from Reform to Revolt. Political Economy and International Relations. Edited by Hinnebusch, 
Raymond and Rina Zintl. Volume 1. Syracuse University Press, 13.  
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corruption of the leadership,54 and institutional decay and inefficiency catalysed 
reforms intended to guarantee the survival of the regime. However, the old guard of 
Assad Senior’s regime resisted reforms, leading to a struggle between the new 
president and the old guard. This would continue until the 10th Ba’ath Party Congress 
in 2005, when Assad Junior brushed aside the old elites, including the Vice President, 
Abdul-Halim Khadam, and replaced them with his own confidants.55 This did not, 
however, translate into a change in the structure of the ruling elites. The newly 
installed confidants, mostly foreign-trained technocrats who were children of the old 
guard, simply disguised and continued the old clientelistic relationships that Assad 
Junior sought to challenge. These new confidants were recruited to help drive 
reforms in the country, yet they left the same people in charge of the state and reform 
decisions thereby undercutting Assad Junior’s attempts to restructure the elite.56 
The people changed, but the dynamics did not. 
In 2005, Assad Junior introduced this blueprint for economic reforms under the title 
of ‘Social Market Economy’.57 This model aimed to increase the role of the private 
sector while maintaining the position of public sector.58 The state under Assad 
Junior was to ‘(re)position [itself] as the guardian of social stability and welfare,’ and 
not the provider of them.59 The market was accepted as the primary means of 
distributing resources and wealth, and a critical partner of the state for economic 
development.60 The remaining restrictions on (international) investments were 
eliminated with the introduction of amendments to Law No. 10. In 2000 and 2007. 
These reforms entailed ‘silent privatization’ of the Syrian economy,61 in which 
services were privatized, but not the public assets. The intensive package of 
economic liberalization served the political interests of the state bourgeoisie, who 
were eager to transform themselves from state capitalists to private capitalists.62 
During the first decade of Assad Junior’s rule, the ‘state bourgeoisie’ and members 
of the military-mercantile complex, which had formed formal and informal economic 
 
54 Hinnebusch 2015, 26-27. 
55 Hinnebusch 2012a, 99. 
56 Zintl 2015, 124.  
57 Hinnebusch 2012a, 99.  
58 Abboud, Samer N. (2015). ‘The “Social” in the Social Market Economy’ in Syria from Reform to Revolt. Political 
Economy and International Relations. Edited by Hinnebusch, Raymond and Rina Zintl. Volume 1. Syracuse 
University Press, 48.  
59 Abboud 2015, 49.  
60 Abboud and Lawson 2013, 333.  
61 Fadilah, Abed. (2010). The Problem of Public-Private partnerships and the Social Dimensions of Development (in 
Arabic). Syrian Economic Society.  
62 Matar 2016, 109.  
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networks,63 started to gradually transmute themselves from a class of state 
capitalists to one of private capitalists. State-run monopolies were replaced by 
private tycoon-run monopolies and quasi-monopolies.  In the years prior to the 
uprising, the dominant private capitalist or property-owning individuals belonged to 
this group. They leveraged their close ties to the regime to exploit economic reforms 
and initiate their own profitable business ventures that added to their private wealth. 
Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of Assad, was said to control 60 percent of the economy 
through a group of business projects and virtual monopolies in telecommunications, 
oil, gas, real estate, construction, banking, and duty-free imports/shops.64 Other 
tycoons included the Tlases and Sulimans, descendants of military and security 
barons. The increased inequality resulting from these reforms festered hostility 
against the ‘elites’ and the ruling family.65  
Economic reforms and structural changes accelerated in the second half of the first 
decade of Assad Junior’s reign and citizens started to feel the impact of structural 
adjustments as subsidies were gradually reduced. In 2008, the prices of bread and 
animal fodders increased by 75 percent, while fuel prices went up by 350 percent.66 
The acceleration of reforms was accompanied by rounds of droughts that hit the 
country from 2006 onward. By the late 2000s, drought had forced almost 300,000 
peasant families to move to cities in search of work, and Syria began receiving 
international aid to address the crisis.67  At the time, UNOCHA said this was one of 
the ‘largest internal displacement in the Middle East in recent years.’68 The regime, 
however, was slow to respond to these dynamics, only establishing an emergency 
programme in 2009. 
Reforms under Assad Junior also included administrative and political reforms in 
addition to economic structural adjustments. Critically, the party’s role in governance 
was reduced, and its patronage network was limited.69 Corporatist organizations 
such as workers’, peasants’, and women’s unions were further affected by these 
reforms as they lost their privileged power positions.70 Members of these unions and 
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corporatist organizations were blamed as the culprits responsible for the economic 
stagnation and were labeled ‘the new reactionaries.’71 In addition, new laws were 
passed to end the ‘overprotection’ that was granted to workers.72 The reforms also 
extended to the military and security forces. According to Said, the regime was not 
able to continue financing the sweeping and generous privileges of the military, and 
the reforms affected the economic activities of the military-owned enterprise.73  For 
example, Assad’s regime stripped many of the military-run public companies that 
were operating at a financial loss, due to corruption or ill-management, thereby 
cutting off the military from their benefits.74  
During the first decade under Assad Junior, the authoritarian bureaucratic state was 
drifting toward a centralized kleptocracy. From the outside, the Syrian state 
resembled an authoritarian bureaucracy, but internally, a centralized kleptocracy led 
by a small elite was emerging.  Parallel to this process, and without an evident link 
to it, the structural changes in the Syrian economy, the withdrawal of the welfare 
state, slow response to drought, and reduction of international aid (at one point by 
one third due to international pressures) led to increased cases of malnutrition, 
deprivation, and hunger, especially in north-eastern governorates.  
 
3. The Outbreak and Evolution of the 
Conflict in Syria 
In the few years preceding the Syrian conflict, the ongoing transformation of Syrian 
politics, society, and economy was accelerated. Although these transformations 
were intended and planned, their outcomes were not always favourable to the 
regime. Assad Junior was set to navigate the new decade with, as Hinnebusch 
argues, a weakened capacity to sustain power over society.75 His rhetoric and 
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occasional implementation of reform gave some social actors hope that the 
authoritarian government was slowly being dismantled.76 However, despite the hope 
for change, Syria remained a highly centralized kleptocracy for the first decade of the 
21st century.  
With the outbreak of the popular uprising, the Syrian political system increasingly 
operated as a political marketplace77 in which political power was commodified and 
monetized.  Politics became increasingly transactional and run based on personal 
transactions with political loyalties and services sold to the highest bidder according 
to the laws of supply and demand. The new system would come to be run according 
to the ‘political budget’, ‘the price of loyalty’, and the political business models and 
skills of politicians, warlords, and rebel leaders. Formal institutions and rules rarely 
constrained the conduct of politics and violence was pervasive. The government’s 
inability to maintain its political and security grip led to the lowering of the barriers 
of entry into politics and the system began to shift towards a deregulated form of 
free competition as the political and military opposition fragmented for a variety of 
reasons including the support of international actors as well as ideology. As the 
conflict progressed, the system shifted again towards a rivalrous oligopoly.  
In March 2011, popular protests broke out in response to the brutality of security 
forces. The security forces’ continued heavy-handed response led to more victims 
and further ignited protests across the country. Initially, central authorities attempted 
to use local actors and mediation to contain popular resentment.78 Further, and in a 
bid to win over the protesters and calm the situation, it also offered to make political 
and economic reforms. Economically, distancing itself from the structural 
adjustment of the 2000s, the state reasserted its role as the provider of economic 
security. It revoked some of the old policies and introduced new reforms.79 
Politically, these included lifting the state of emergency, allowing the establishment 
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of parties, the introduction of a new constitution, and a national dialogue.80 Socially, 
however, the government and cronies with links to the authorities organized several 
‘national demonstrations’, during which employees of the public sectors and crony-
owned companies, as well as students, were forced to participate in support of the 
state. Media activism by the opposition was further mirrored by loyalists of the 
Syrian government and the national media was used to denounce the protest 
movement.   
Despite the Syrian government’s efforts to end the protests, they continued 
unabated. This period marked the emergence of the political marketplace as the 
government lost its monopoly over politics and violence with various opposition and 
rebel groups challenging the state through both political and violent means. 
Politically, initial calls from Syrians in exile for an uprising were soon met by local 
actors who organized protests against the regime. Groups of close-knit activists 
formed what later came to be known as the Local Coordination Committees (LCC).81 
Calling for national unity and democracy, organizing political campaigns, and issuing 
political statements, among others, these groups challenged the political narrative 
and sovereignty of the Syrian government.  
Simultaneously, and in addition to the grassroots groups, three other groups 
challenged the government: the traditional or ‘internal’ opposition represented by 
(leftist) parties in Syria; the external opposition represented by members of the 
outlawed Syrian brotherhood and exiled politicians; and lastly, a third group centred 
around religious opposition to the regime encompassing Salafists and other 
religious movements. These different groups, while united in their opposition to the 
Syrian government, differed in how they sought to change the regime as well as their 
political aspiration for the future of the country. They were further divided across 
their alliances, as they became recipients of financial aid from competing regional 
and international actors.  
While the traditional or ‘internal’ opposition formed a coalition that opposed 
international intervention, the LCC and exiled opposition individuals and movements 
formed the National Council, a political umbrella for the Syrian opposition abroad. 
The council was announced in Turkey in October 2011, but it only lasted until late 
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2012 when in a bid to broaden the representation of the Syrian opposition, the 
National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was announced in 
Doha, Qatar. The coalition established many offices/structures in Turkey, which were 
politicized and polarized according to personal interests and partisan agendas and 
were backed by rival regional sponsors particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In 
December 2015, the Higher Negotiation Committee was established by the coalition 
to spearhead the negotiations with the regime.82  
Table 1: Main Political Actors 2011 - 2015 
Syrian Government/Regime Opposition 
• The Syrian Government was 
supported by the Ba’ath Party as well 
as new formations linked to leftist 
parties and Palestinian factions.    
• Grassroots activists / Local 
Coordination Committees.  
• Traditional or internal opposition 
parties (Leftists and Kurdish parties). 
• Exiled opposition (a variety of small 
groups and the Muslim Brotherhood). 
• Syrian National Council (Formed in 
October 2011, the council operated as 
an umbrella bringing together the vast 
majority of Syrian opposition including 
the aforementioned three). 
• National Coalition of Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces; 
successor of the Syrian National 
Council.   
Militarily, the government was challenged by a plethora of new military formations. 
Concomitant to early protests, several armed attacks against security forces were 
reported, though these were limited and scattered. Observers argue that the 
excessive use of force in the government’s response was the driver of widespread 
militarization, which quickly escalated. While (counter) violence by the opposition 
was starting to emerge toward the end of May and the beginning of June, these 
attacks remained unclaimed. The first significant incident was in June 2011, when 
scores of regime forces were killed. As incidents increased in volume and 
sophistication, the government moved from the ‘security-focused’ to a ‘military’ 
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solution and armed forces were deployed in cities against insurgents and protesters 
equally. Unwilling to engage unarmed protesters, army recruits and conscripted 
soldiers defected in increasing numbers.83  
In July 2011, defected army officers established the Free Syrian Army (FSA), vowing 
to protect protesters. Initially, the FSA was popularly embraced and widely 
supported. It consisted partly of defected soldiers, but the vast majority of its fighters 
were civilians who had taken up arms. As it grew, the FSA represented a common 
umbrella that loosely gathered locally organized insurgents and rebels were only 
active in their hometowns and lacked unity and centralization. The majority of 
brigades and formations that were formed in the autumn and winter of 2011 under 
the FSA adopted religious names, which allowed the Syrian authorities to paint them 
as religious extremists.84 There were several failed attempts to unify these groups, 
but they fractured along ideological and regional alliances lines creating a market for 
the highest bidder.   
In addition to FSA forces, the majority of whose affiliates claimed to favour a 
democratic transition and to have inclusive aspirations, fundamentalist groups with 
Salafist leanings emerged and expanded in late-2011 and early 2012.  These 
included groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and the Islam Army. Through mergers, 
infighting, or end of (regional) support, some of these groups dissolved, grew 
stronger or were absorbed by bigger formations. Jihadist groups such as the al-
Nusra Front, an al-Qaida linked group, also joined the conflict early on. Al-Nusra 
announced its formation in late 2011 and carried out suicide bombings in Damascus 
in December 2011 and in Damascus and Aleppo in 2012.  
In response to the rapid militarization of the uprising, the regime deployed its elite 
armed forces in support of the stretched security forces. Since the regime lacked 
trust in the regular army, whose members were conscripts and were increasingly 
defecting, the regime relied on republican guards and other units of almost 
completely Alawite composition, such as the 4th Division that operated under the 
command of Assad Junior’s brother. The regime further increased the cohesion of 
its military and security institutions by abandoned the ‘Trinity of Leadership’ 
approach.  This approach was previously used as a sectarian balancing act in these 
institutions under Assad Senior, and populated Senior positions with Alawi loyalists. 
Al Mustafa shows how the 40 most powerful and Senior positions of the armed and 
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security forces were occupied by Alawite officers.85 
Furthermore, the regime established and increased its dependence on paramilitary 
groups. Üngör argues that paramilitarism became a prominent feature of the Syrian 
conflict and that its use was a key aspect of the Assad regime’s repression.86 These 
paramilitary forces or the so-called “Shabbiha,” a catch-all category for irregular, pro-
government militias dressed in (semi-) civilian gear and linked organically to the 
regime, became gradually formalized beginning in 2012, first in the Popular 
Committees, and then in the National Defense Forces (NDF). The term Shabbiha 
dates back to the late 1970s and early 1980s and referred to associates of criminal 
groups that were linked to high-ranking officers and members of the Assad family. 
These groups were involved in illicit activities and human rights violations against 
the opposition at the time.  
While initially the state deployed and financed these individuals, this changed once 
they were formed into groups and became formalized in paramilitary formations. 
Cronies associated with the regime such as Assad Junior’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, 
financed the creation and operations of these groups. Throughout the conflict, 
however, these groups operated officially under the control of the regime and within 
its prescribed space. The regular army was the central platform for coordinating and 
providing logistical support to these groups, notably by sourcing and distributing 
weapons.87 While recruits came from all backgrounds, some groups maintained a 
distinctly sectarian identity. However, none of these groups challenged the central 
authority. Commanders who were rumoured to deviate from the prescribed line, were 
quickly neutralized without any impact on the overall strategy or military strength of 
the regime. Finally, as of 2013, the Syrian authorities allowed the formation of private 
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Table 2: Main Actors 2011 – 2013 
The Syrian Government Opposition (including Islamists) 
• The Syrian Government (armed forces, 
security forces, and paramilitaries) 
• Syrian opposition (Free Syrian Army 
and rebels) 
• Islamist groups (Islam army, Ahrah al-
Sham, among others) 
• Al-Qaida linked al-Nusra front  
Table 3: Source of Funding 2011 – 2013  
The Syrian Government 
and Allies  
• Syrian institutions, and cronies 
• Hezbollah directly received funding from Iran.  
Opposition forces 
(including Islamists) 
• Regional countries (Qatar, UAE, KSA, and Turkey), 
Lebanese politicians, Syrian diaspora, and 
donations.  
Jihadists / al-Qaida • Donations (Gulf and Syrian diaspora) and support 
from international Jihadists 
 
From Local Protests to Internationalization: Civil and Proxy War 
Regional and international support to the conflict parties escalated violence and 
prolonged the conflict, which was declared a civil war in July 2012.89 Two dynamics 
drove the characterization as civil war: escalation of violence and territorial 
contestation.90 As the conflict escalated and the government lost its monopoly on 
violence, it gradually withdrew from the far east of the country leaving much of the 
country’s grain-growing areas and oil resources to opposition factions. Benefiting 
from safe havens in Turkey and external arming and financing from the US, France, 
UK, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, the Free Syrian Army, various rebel groups, and 
increasingly Jihadists managed to drive the government forces away from strategic 
areas, such as border crossings, which came under the control of various factions.91  
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The retreat of the government forces and increased prowess of the opposition led 
to the creation of ‘liberated areas,’ in which competitive political systems and state-
building projects were attempted by the opposition and rebels.92 Notwithstanding 
the international support, and at times due to its fragmentation and diverging 
agendas, the Syrian secular and moderate opposition did not introduce a viable 
governance system, which enabled Salafist and Jihadist movements to move in and 
fill the void. Salafist movements such as Jaysh al-Islam in the countryside of 
Damascus, as well as Jihadist movements such as Tahrir al-Sham and ISIS, 
produced the most robust attempts at local governance. The latter announced the 
establishment of a caliphate in the territories it controlled in Syria and Iraq prompting 
the creation of an international coalition led by the US to fight it, while the Jihadist 
Tahrir al-Sham would grow later in the conflict to become the dominant force in Idlib.   
Meanwhile, the combination of external support (financial, military, and logistics) 
and increased number of fighters on the side of the opposition forces, threatened 
not only the regime’s control of main cities, including the capital but its very 
existence. This prompted the Assad Junior regime to look to regional and 
international allies for support. The Syrian regime relied politically and militarily on 
Russia and China, although to a lesser degree. It further benefited from the military 
and financial support of its allies Iran and Hezbollah, both of which provided fighters 
as well as training on crowd control, urban warfare, and insurgent tactics.93 These 
groups each had distinct agendas but operated within the overall sphere of the 
Syrian regime. Recruited by Iran, Shiite militias from Iraq, Pakistani and Afghan 
refugees in Iran also operated within this military system. 
As the conflict progressed, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (YPD), a sister 
organization of the Turkish Kurdistan Worker’s Party, consolidated its power in the 
oil- and grain-rich parts of eastern Syria. The party, which had assumed power in the 
region after an agreement with the retreating government forces, announced an 
autonomous administration in the north and east of Syria in January 2014.94 While 
initially dependent on support from the Syrian government, the party’s armed wing 
or the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) became the recipient of direct U.S. support 
when it was chosen as the U.S. partner in the fight against ISIS. The party further 
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received support from several European countries as well as Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. As the conflict progressed, and under pressure from the US, the party created 
the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with the aim of incorporating non-Kurdish 
elements into its ranks.95  
Table 4: Main Actors 2011 – 2020  
Actors Source of Support 
Syrian government (armed and 
security forces as well as 
paramilitary groups) and its allies, 
including Shiite militias such as 
Hezbollah and various Iraqi and 
Afghan militias as well as Iranian 
forces 
State institutions, cronies, Iran, and Russia. 
Paramilitary groups associated with the 
government were engaged in illicit activities 
including pillaging and looting, trafficking of 
drugs and artefacts as well as abduction for 
ransom (although arguably for personal 
enrichment and not for military purposes).   
Opposition forces (including 
Islamists) 
Regional support (Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and UAE), international support (UK, France, 
and the US), illicit activities including trafficking 
of drugs, humans, and artefacts as well as 
racketeering and levying taxes.  
Al-Qaida 
Donations, racketeering, taxes, illicit activities, 
including abduction for ransom, and trafficking, 
oil smuggling.  
ISIS 
Donations, taxes, illicit activities including 
trafficking, abduction, and oil smuggling.  
Democratic Union Party (YPD) 
Syrian government (initially) and international 
support (US, UK and France; later on, UAE and 
Saudi Arabia), oil smuggling and (human) 
trafficking.   
The Syrian conflict entered a new dimension with the direct intervention of 
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international actors such as the US,96 Russia,97 and Turkey,98 which directly 
intervened in 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively. The same period witnessed 
increased direct Israeli intervention, albeit via airstrikes which according to an Israeli 
official exceeded 200 attacks within two years by 2018.99 These interventions, 
characterized by reliance on national proxies, changed the realities on the ground 
and contributed to the creation of internal borders as well as the emergence of three 
distinct zones of control: eastern Syria under the control of the US and Kurdish-
dominated SDF; Idlib, northern Aleppo, and parts of northern Syria under Tahrir al-
Sham and opposition forces respectively with the support of Turkey; while the rest 
of the country fell back under the control of the Syrian government with Russian 
support. The internal borders have been dynamic, and crossline fighting,100 as well 
as competition over land and resources,101 has repeatedly erupted threatening to 
further complicate and further internationalize the conflict. Another consequence of 
the international intervention in Syria has been the use of Syrian proxies in regional 
conflicts, such as Libya, where Turkey102 and Russia103  have both deployed 
members of their Syrian proxies to fight along with their respective allies. Syrian 
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Table 5: National Actors and International Supporters 
National Actor(s) (in some scenarios a proxy) 
International 
Supporter(s) 
• The Syrian Government and allies. 
• Syrian Government and its institutions are not to be 
considered a proxy of Russia, although the latter does enjoy 
strong links with the military and security institutions. 
Russia 
• SDF and a small number of FSA in the Tanf area 
US (UK and France) 
• National Army 
• Tahrir al-Sham Turkey 
 
4. The Political Economy of the Syrian 
Conflict  
Prior to the conflict, Syria’s economy was among the most diversified in the Middle 
East. It relied on a mix of sectors including energy, agriculture, trade, transport, and 
manufacturing.104 However, the direct and indirect consequences of the conflict 
have created an economic crisis. Overall, the conflict generated 530 billion USD in 
total estimated economic losses, of which GDP accounts for 79 percent of the total 
loss.105 GDP dwindled from $60.2 billion in 2010 to around $21.6 billion in 2019. In 
the same period, public expenditure dropped substantially from 28.9 percent of GDP 
in 2011 to 13.3 percent in 2019 and current expenditure fell from 21.6 percent of 
GDP in 2011 to 10.5 percent in 2019. Public subsidies also witnessed a consistent 
decrease as a percentage of the current GDP from 20.2 percent in 2011 to 4.9 
percent in 2019. In 2021, public spending will be 82 percent of the planned budget, 
which is estimated at $2.7 billion.106 Meanwhile, foreign and domestic public debt 
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increased from 30 percent of GDP in 2010 to 208 percent in 2019.107 The conflict 
has reduced export receipts, created a foreign currency crisis, fuelled inflation, and 
created a scarcity of basic goods. With the purchasing power contracting 
approximately 93 percent,108 combined with paralysis of the economy, 
unemployment, poverty, and dependence on international aid have increased.  
The conflict has also fundamentally changed the organization and structure of the 
economy. It destroyed existing business and trade networks while encouraging a 
major expansion of illegal and informal activities and networks. Simultaneously, 
financial resources were diverted from the formal into the informal economy.109 
Warlords and war crony capitalists were the main beneficiaries. Increased 
unemployment and disruption of normal economic life made life more precarious 
and pushed young men to join various military formations and militias, where they 
became dependent on salaries from armed groups dominated by localized warlords 
who resorted to smuggling, kidnapping, and taxation of goods at checkpoints as well 
as external funding which therefore had an incentive to keep the fighting going. 
Predatory activities such as the looting of conquered territories became 
widespread.110  
War crony capitalists, on the other hand, thrived on sanctions-busting or acted as 
middlemen between the various fighting actors. This included oil and cereal 
smuggling, among others. As the conflict progressed, these individuals were 
increasingly integrated into the formal economy by laundering their money through 
the formation of formal companies in government-held areas as well as other zones 
of control. Meanwhile, crony capitalist businesspeople and elites already affiliated 
with the regime largely maintained and expanded their operations within the country. 
Their sustained support allowed them the opportunity to enrich themselves by 
gaining preferential access to industries and economic sectors that were abandoned 
by competitors, who fled the country. They are further set to benefit from the 
deepening of neoliberal reforms and ‘reconstruction opportunities.’111  
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While transformations and distortions of the Syrian economy may be traced back to 
a compilation of conscious actions, policy choices and discreet interventions by 
different actors,112 the physical fragmentation into different zones of control and 
creation of internal barriers has played an important role in the deterioration of the 
economy and humanitarian situation in the country. This fragmentation, among 
other considerations such as the lack of a political solution, continues to shape and 
shadow the discussion on reconstruction. The reconstruction process, replicating 
the main characteristics of the geopolitical struggle within the country, has turned 
into a battle over power, territory, and resources among rival local, national, and 
international actors.113 The reconstruction process has so far been fragmented, 
uncoordinated, and only catered for the interest of the parties involved in the armed 
conflict, including warlords and cronies, instead of the needs of the population that 
were affected by the conflict.114 
Meanwhile, the conflict and deteriorating economy have culminated in one of the 
worst humanitarian situations of the 21st century. More than half of Syria’s 
population is internally or externally displaced. As of 1 March 2021, approximately 
13.4 million people representing 75 percent of the population were in need of 
humanitarian assistance.115 Within this, 12.4 million people were food insecure, 1.9 
of whom were severely food insecure, an increase of 4.5 million people from 2020.116 
In addition, 1.8 million were at risk of falling into food insecurity.117  In March 2021, 
the Syrian pound reached its highest rate on record and was traded at 4600 per 
dollar, nudging more people into poverty, with two million living in extreme poverty. 
A 236 percent increase in the average price of the food basket in December 2020 
was reported in comparison to December 2019, 29 times the pre-conflict cost.118 
Another impact of the pandemic has been the decrease in remittances sent by 
Syrians abroad, a main source of income for many families in the country.119  The 
COVID-19 pandemic has compounded the situation further and led to further 
deterioration in the living conditions of the vast majority of people as measures were 
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enforced to stem the spread of the virus.  
The humanitarian crisis in the country is not exclusively an outcome of the conflict 
or the deteriorating economy. Motivated by the logic of emerging political markets, 
policies and interventions created or were intentionally subverted and consequently 
contributed to the rise of some of the worst humanitarian crises throughout the 
conflict. To understand the contexts in which these political marketplaces came to 
exist, this study focuses on the conflict economy at the sub-national level or conflict 
sub-economies. A Chatham House study of the political economy of the Syrian 
conflict outlines three distinct types of conflict sub-economies: a) capital cities, b) 
transit areas and borderlands, and c) oil-rich areas.120 These sub-level economies 
emerged under different political actors with the first (mainly) in government-held 
areas, while the second and third in the areas under the control of the Syrian 
opposition as well as ISIS and Kurdish-dominated SDF, respectively. Currently, with 
the passage of time, and the hardening of internal borders with the latter actors 
taking control over cities, a similar sub-economy to capital cities is emerging. The 
actions and practices of local actors have shaped the nature of the war economies 
in these areas and contributed to the rise of different political markets across the 
country.  
Table 6: Conflict Sub-Economies  
Capital Cities 
• Patronage authority: control of state institution, assets, 
and jobs. 
• Leveraging the legal authority of the state 
• Monetary and financial authority 
• Access to international organizations and international aid 
• Reconstruction (MK’s addition)  
Transit Areas and 
Borderlands 
• Taxing the movements of goods within transit areas 
within the country and taxation at borderlands (sieges) 
• Arbitrage across internal ‘borders’ 
• Arbitrage across international borders 
Oil-Rich Areas 
• Selling oil   
• Smuggling oil (full cycle of the supply chain including 
transportation and (refinery) processing) 
• Oil across international borders 
Source: Eaton et al. 2019 
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5. The Political Marketplace and 
Humanitarian Crisis in Syria 
 
Multiple marketplaces emerged during the conflict, prolonging the conflict and 
leading to humanitarian suffering across the country. While all deserve further 
examination, this section will focus on the marketplace that emerged at the 
intersection of transit areas and borderlands with a particular focus on sieges. The 
war economy at this sub-level revolved around the taxation of goods and movements 
as well as arbitrage. As the conflict progressed, this led to several humanitarian 
crises in the country. All warring parties used food and water as a political and 
military tool to convince the population to remain loyal or to leverage political and 
military change on the ground. Siege warfare emerged as an effective strategy, and 
it was extensively used in the Syrian conflict. Although the Syrian regime and its allies 
were responsible for the majority of cases, opposition forces, ISIS, the local franchise 
of al-Qaida or al-Nusra, Kurdish-dominated SDF, and the international coalition led by 
U.S. forces all employed sieges against their enemies. An estimated 2.5 million 
Syrians lived under siege throughout the conflict.121 
Early on, unable to defeat or roll back rebels, government forces deployed sieges as 
a counter-insurgency strategy aiming to isolate and contain sources of rebellion and 
to prevent them from spreading to key areas of strategic importance.122 Sieges were 
implemented using direct violence, including the bombing of exit areas, the 
deployment of snipers against civilians attempting to leave sieges, massacres, and 
the application of chemical weapon attacks, and, later, through the strategic use of 
starvation and deprivation of basic services and needs. The ‘Starve or Surrender’ 
strategy, as it would come to be known given the graffiti sprayed by soldiers close 
to checkpoints, included cutting off food supplies, water, electricity, gas, waste 
services, as well as medical care. Infrastructure and public projects, including 
agricultural ones, were further targeted to undermine the resilience of besieged 
communities and to prevent the formation of competitive or viable political 
opposition groups and structures. In addition to targeted attacks on bakeries, 
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communal kitchens, and hospitals, besieged areas further came under occasional 
indiscriminate attacks on residential areas, which aimed to demoralize inhabitants, 
as well as attacks against any movement inward or outward, which brought normal 
economic life to a halt. The ‘starve’ component was aimed to subvert the support of 
rebels among the populace and to force the people of the regions under siege into 
submission.123    
The enforcement of sieges and their intensity varied across regions and their military 
and political objectives were subverted by the logic of a war economy that emerged 
soon after they were imposed. Islamists and ISIS were less effective in their use of 
sieges due to their lack of airpower, which the government forces and US coalition 
enjoyed. Furthermore, areas that were besieged by these factions did receive 
intermittent aid through airlift operations and hence opportunities for racketeering 
were less in comparison with government- or SDF-besieged areas. For the 
government forces and the SDF-led militias supported by the US, the main objective 
for these sieges was military.  They were used to contain insurgencies in specific 
geographies, as demonstrated by the fact that no other consideration prevailed when 
the government forces or SDF forces were ready to recapture any of these areas. 
Rebels and Islamists had a different calculus. In addition to gaining political 
recognition and financial resources in the prevailing highly-polarized and sectarian 
context, Islamists and rebels besieging an area defined by its sectarian identity 
signalled a commitment to armed conflict defined along sectarian lines and a show 
of solidarity with other areas. 
As the siege warfare created artificial scarcities and opportunities for windfall profits 
for those in control, a war economy logic prevailed and associates of the regime 
forces and its allied militias, as well as military opposition factions, took advantage 
of the situation to accumulate profit. This undermined the military objective of the 
siege and resulted in prolonging the conflict. Despite the negative impact of these 
practices on the overall war efforts, anecdotal evidence indicates that the revenues 
from the sieges were used to increase the government’s foreign currency reserves. 
NGOs working within these areas were mostly dependent on international support, 
which arrived in hard currency and was exchanged in the local market at the time 
when the government had run out of hard currency. For the rebels, returns from the 
control of checkpoints enabled them to consolidate their control. Politically, these 
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sieges were used to show the unviability of the opposition’s political projects. In 
several areas, the government kept paying the salaries of public sector employees, 
and students were allowed to leave these areas to undertake exams in government-
held areas, where food and residence were provided by the competent ministries. 
The sieges were also strategically utilized to consolidate alliances and reward crony 
businessmen who were given monopolies over transactions to and from besieged 
areas. Such transactions and contracts were rumoured to have been negotiated with 
the highest echelon of the Syrian regime. This was not limited to cronies, however, 
as the siege was associated with corruption and allowed lower-rank officials to 
engage in crossline deal-making with moneyed elites in the besieged areas with links 
to the rebels generating enormous profits. This underground economy helped some 
people survive who would not have without it. However, it also represented a 
massive transfer of resources from ordinary Syrians to a mafia-like network of war 
profiteers on both sides of the conflict. 
The pro-regime forces established checkpoints at strategic entry points allowing for 
illegal war economy practices including taxation of goods and movement. Army and 
intelligence chiefs were said to be the main beneficiaries of the financial returns on 
the side of the government. Checkpoints were further reported to obstruct the work 
of humanitarian organizations. Aid obstruction and confiscation were permanent 
features of sieges as humanitarian aid was tightly restricted and controlled or 
entirely blocked. Meanwhile, these practices were mirrored by the opposition armed 
groups in the besieged areas. These groups operated and controlled checkpoints (in 
some cases tunnels too), which enabled them to levy taxes on goods and aid and to 
generate income that allowed them to sustain their control and extend their 
influence. When aid was allowed into besieged areas, it was often diverted from 
those most in need and manipulated to consolidate control and gain allegiance. Due 
to the significant gains from checkpoints, including the control of aid, infighting 
among rebel groups over control of strategic checkpoints and smuggling routes was 
reported throughout the conflict.124  
Despite the huge profits generated by these practices, armed groups offloaded the 
burden of governance to non-governmental organizations and charities, which 
sprang up and were supported by international donors.125 Local and international 
organizations indirectly financed the warring actors by paying hefty sums to smuggle 
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their goods into besieged areas. Meanwhile, co-optation degrees of these 
organizations varied under various actors. Local Non-government organizations 
(NGOs) had little space to operate freely in areas under Islamist control, such as the 
countryside of Damascus, as opposed to areas controlled by the FSA in the same 
region. NGOs with culturally non-conformist programmes or with opposing political 
views were harassed, targeted, and/or banned from operating in certain areas, such 
as Douma in the countryside of Damascus. Meanwhile, international organizations, 
such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Syrian American Medical Society 
(SAMS), had a bigger margin for manoeuvre due to their massive funds, and for fear 
of attracting negative international attention.  
The role of ‘middlemen’ was paramount in regions suffering from sieges. A selected 
group of traders and businessmen, mostly with origins in and connections to 
besieged areas, were among the main beneficiaries of the dire humanitarian 
situation. These traders and businessmen secured contracts and monopolies over 
the supply of goods into these areas. Using bribes and their connections on both 
sides of the siege, these middlemen managed to distribute their goods to local 
traders, who in their turn monopolized these goods and made enormous profits. For 
example, in late 2017, in Eastern-Ghouta, in the countryside of Damascus, the cost 
of one kilogram of bread was 1,150 percent more than in nearby Damascus.126 From 
January 2017, bread and wheat flour prices increased by more than 174 percent and 
390 percent, respectively, while sugar prices rose by more than 1,000 percent.127  
There are no reliable statistics of the number of deaths due to starvation and related 
diseases, despite strong evidence that starvation tactics are implicated in the overall 
number of civilian mortalities since 2012. Starvation-related deaths were reported in 
Madayya and Zabadani in the countryside of Damascus, while in Eastern-Ghouta the 
global acute malnutrition rate and stunting rate were estimated at 11.9 percent and 
36 percent, respectively.128  
Despite rumours about the involvement at the highest level of the political elites, 
including by representatives of the president’s brother, Maher al-Assad, and although 
the regime was said to benefit from the hard currency that was made available by 
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sieges, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that that profiteering was part of a 
wider political strategy by the Syrian regime. Throughout the sieges and across all 
areas, there were several episodes of negotiations with local elites and armed 
groups to end these sieges through reconciliation agreements; granting safe 
passage to rebels wishing to vacate or the option to regularize their legal status. 
Such attempts were reportedly foiled by hardliners on both sides, particularly the 
rebels who feared the return of the state and refused to leave their areas and homes. 
An analysis of the military strategy and attacks of the regime further shows that the 
main delays in recapturing these areas could be attributed to lack of military capacity 
and shortages of trusted personnel rather than the availability of profiteering 
opportunities. This further applies to SDF in areas such as Raqqa. The regime 
depended on a select group of elite forces that were deployed to the besieged areas 
separately and hence action against other areas was to wait. Furthermore, certain 
sieges, such as Madaya, on the border with Lebanon, are ought to be seen through 
their strategic importance to actors such as Hezbollah, to whom Syria and the border 
region represent a strategic depth, as well as the regime during the early stages of 
the conflict when the latter was retreating and talks about partitions along sectarian 
lines were on the table. 
 
Syrian Agriculture and Food Security: Crises within the Crisis 
The end of siege warfare and its accompanying food insecurity, hunger, and 
starvation did not mean that these areas witnessed much improvement. The 
deterioration of the agricultural sector along with other dynamics continue to have a 
severe impact on Syrians and their food security.  Prior to the conflict, agriculture 
was one of Syria’s main economic sectors and the country had the most thriving 
agriculture sector in the Middle East. The sector was prioritized as a part of the 
Ba’athist governments’ strategy to achieve food sufficiency and economic 
independence. It was further a part of a wider quest to garner and maintain support 
from the rural constituency of the Ba’ath party.129 The state developed extensive 
irrigation projects, provided direct and indirect subsidies through the Agricultural and 
Cooperate Bank, and laid out an elaborate administrative structure, including the 
Farmer’s union, cooperatives, and local associations.130 Strategic crops, wheat, in 
particular, were at the heart of this strategy. The state intervened in planning, pricing, 
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and marketing policies, and was among the main customer of the country’s crops.131 
These efforts culminated in Syria achieving food sufficiency in 1994.132  
This achievement, however, came with a high price to the national budget, due to 
corruption, clientelism, and ill-management. For example, in 2000, the benefits of all 
state farms in one of the biggest projects in eastern Syria were estimated at 25.5 
million SYP, whereas the production costs reached 645 million SYP.133 
Environmental degradation was another cost of this strategy, which led to the 
exhaustion of groundwater and soil resources. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
repeated droughts and fluctuation of the rainfall levels compounded the situation 
and accelerated the government’s policies to shift away from self-sufficiency 
towards a policy of import. This entailed an overhaul of the agricultural sector and a 
reduction of subsidies for agricultural inputs. Subsequently, agriculture’s 
contribution to GDP decreased from 27 percent to 18 percent between 2001 and 
2007.134 In comparison, before 2000, the agricultural sector accounted for up to one-
third of the GDP and employed up to a third of the working population.135  
The conflict hit the agriculture sector hard and the fragmentation of the country into 
different control zones disturbed its activities. Throughout the conflict, violence to 
capture agriculture has been deployed regularly to control valuable farmland, 
harvests, or to deny such resources to adversaries.136 Arson (including threats of) 
and targeted attacks on crops and workers were reported throughout the conflict.137  
The main regions of agricultural production were scenes of war including the Jazira 
in eastern Syria, the center of wheat production, the Ghouta, the Al Ghab plain, 
vegetables and fruit production areas, and Idlib, where wheat and olives are grown.  
During the conflict, the sector entered a vicious cycle with displacement as well as 
farmers’ rural migration to cities, destruction of irrigation facilities, lack of seeds and 
fuel as well as basic supplies and pesticides to keep the harvest healthy.138 The 
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weaponization of (access to) water and losses of livestock due to conflict, diseases, 
and lack of fodders have further exacerbated the woes of the sector and agricultural 
community. The creeping involvement and interests of warlords and war cronies 
looking to invest in legitimate businesses have come at the cost of small owners and 
may generate further problems in the future.139  
Moreover, environmental degradation resulting from the conflict and lack of 
effective governance has had its toll on the sector and remains a very serious threat 
looming over the future of the sector and its potential recovery. This is especially 
true in northwest and northeast Syria, where the decade-long war has left a ‘toxic 
environmental legacy.’140 Illegal oil refineries, which dot(ted) the area and represent 
a major source of income to local communities and de facto authorities, have 
contributed to unprecedented soil, air, and water pollution. There are numerous 
reports about farmland tarred with crude and rivers swirling with pollution. In 2019, 
and after years of draughts, heavy rains flooded wheat fields with oil-contaminated 
water reducing the quality of the harvest. The negative impact of pollution is not only 
limited to crops as livestock and their products are said to also be heavily 
impacted.141   
Despite all these challenges, agriculture continued to play the role of an economic 
protection network during the conflict, providing job opportunities and food sources 
amid tragic conflict conditions.142 The share of the sector in the GDP has increased, 
although statistics show that the sector has overall contracted to approximately 40 
percent. In 2016, according to the World Food Programme, the losses of the 
agricultural sector in Syria since the beginning of the conflict were estimated at 
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approximately $16 billion.143 Still, the confluence of these developments impacted 
the overall food security of the country and the crisis is evident in that the country, 
which was self-sufficient, has become increasingly dependent on wheat imports and 
humanitarian aid.   
The deterioration of wheat production is illustrative of the impact of the conflict on 
agriculture. Syria has had drastically lower output compared to before the conflict 
erupted. In a good year, Syria used to produce 4 million tonnes and was able to export 
1.5 million tonnes.  However, domestic wheat production is estimated to have halved 
in the first six years of the conflict forcing the government to import between 40 and 
50 percent of the domestic consumption needs.144 Of the 140 wheat collection 
centres that were in operation in Syria before 2011, only 40 remained in 2017, and 
four out of five yeast factories in the country have completely shut down.145 Control 
over wheat production and its main infrastructure areas changed hands throughout 
the conflict and two-thirds of the wheat production areas have come under the 
control of ISIS and the Kurdish-controlled SDF, which enabled both parties to 
consolidate their power and shape the economy around this sector.  
In addition to a reduction in production, wheat purchase and transportation were 
politicized, and a war economy developed around it. This economy involved ISIS, the 
Kurdish-dominated the SDF, and the Syrian government. Middlemen, such as the 
Qaterji brothers in Aleppo, who is associated with the Syrian government, and Fouad 
Fayez Mohammad, who is known as the Prince of Eastern Syria and is reported to 
have close relations with the SDF, operated as traders between the various actors. 
Qaterji and local traders working across lines bought up wheat, and oil, from Raqqa 
and Deir ez-Zour and gave 20 percent to ISIS.146 After SDF came to control the area, 
business continued unabated until the US pressed to end the arrangements in place. 
Increasingly deploying sanctions and prohibitions as a tool of economic warfare to 
realize regime change, the US pressed the SDF to stop working with the regime’s 
middlemen,147 and hence the Kurdish-dominated SDF prevented the selling of wheat 
to government institutions charged with collecting the harvest.   
The deterioration of the agricultural sector and increased needs due to politicization, 
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among other factors, have elicited responses from the various belligerents. The 
provision of food, especially bread, is seen as an indicator of reliable governance and 
opened the door to competition between all actors. The Syrian government sees the 
revival of agriculture as a prerequisite for the country to withstand economic 
pressure and has marketed it for strategic investment.148 It further prioritized wheat 
for agriculture over other crops and encouraged its cultivation in new regions. In 
2020, the government announced that 11 percent of the total budget would be 
allocated for the purchase of the local wheat harvest.149 In continuation of its pre-
conflict policies, the government has abstained from subsidising inputs and resorted 
to using price-support schemes to shape both production and the market, while 
compensating for shortages in local production with imports.150 Other actors 
including the ‘Interim Government’, which operates in Turkish-controlled areas, the 
HTS-affiliated ‘Salvation Government,’ which is active in Idlib, and SDF de facto 
authorities that are in control of northeast Syria, have deployed farmers supported 
programmes and protectionist policies to prevent the sale of crops to the Syrian 
government.151 
The government’s efforts to regain control of and rebuild the agriculture sector have 
not gone unchallenged. Madi argues that a ‘wheat war’ broke out between the Syrian 
government and the Kurdish-dominated SDF.152 This war over the control of wheat 
plays out at different levels including prices, control of lands, roads, and border-
crossings. Overbidding each other, both actors have attempted to purchase 
domestic productions. However, emboldened by U.S. support, and compounding on 
the inability of the government to stop the collapse of the Syrian pound, the Kurdish-
dominated SDF raised its local wheat purchasing price and pegged it to the going 
rate of the dollar, which outbid the Syrian government. Furthermore, employing 
threats of confiscation, the Kurdish-dominated militias warned locals against any 
attempts to smuggle the crop outwards and declared its aim to stockpile 18 months' 
worth of supply and only open sales to government territories in the case of a 
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surplus, despite the fact that the country is suffering from severe shortages of 
wheat.153 
The war over wheat is taking place while the economic and food security conditions 
are continuously worsening and the need to ensure sufficient supplies of wheat to 
the Syrian population is becoming increasingly urgent. Although never experienced 
during the peak of the conflict, government-controlled areas are at risk of facing 
severe bread shortages,154 and queues for bread have become the norm.155 In 
response, the Syrian Government turned to the international market.156 However, U.S. 
sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and a deepening financial crisis, including a lack of 
foreign currency reserve to access foreign markets, are among the main barriers that 
have occasionally rendered the Syrian Government’s efforts fruitless. Several 
international tenders to buy wheat have closed without any contract being 
awarded.157 War profiteers, and close associates of the Syrian Government, have 
filled the void for now, but with a higher cost for the state.158 Although not in sight 
yet, however, given the country’s dependence on aid as well as the secondary impact 
of the COVID-19, Syria’s inability to obtain its needs of wheat might bring it closer to 
famine, as cautioned by a Senior WFP official.159 
The wheat crisis in Syria not only has implications for the food security of Syrians 
but also on the geopolitics of the conflict. As the crisis has intensified, Syria has 
become increasingly dependent on wheat supplies from Russia, which Russia has 
failed to fulfill deals on several occasions This issue has been further exacerbated 
by an ambiguous deal signed in February 2021 with Russia and Turkey.  The two 
countries are said to have agreed to supply the government-held areas with 100s of 
tons of wheat that were in the Raqqa province silos and were under the control of 
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SDF militias before Turkey captured the area.160 Along with aid, which is provided by 
wealthy donors, the actions of Russia and Turkey highlight the increasing importance 
of external actors’ role in guaranteeing the food security of Syrians.  
Wheat control and destruction of the agriculture sector are not the only factors 
impacting food security for Syrians. Competition over energy supplies is taking 
shape and its outcome will be significant for the country’s economy and its recovery. 
After the retreat of government forces from eastern Syria, the bulk of Syrian oil and 
gas al-Hassakah and Deir ez-Zor fell under the control of ISIS and the Kurdish-
dominated SDF militias, both of which capitalized on the revenues to consolidate 
power and maintain control. Despite occasional bombardment and ongoing conflict, 
heavy and light crude oil production carried on, albeit in a reduced capacity due to 
lack of maintenance, technical skills, and deteriorating security situation.161 Lacking 
the means to process the oil, these actors operated with the Syrian government, 
which controlled refineries, as well as opposition and tribal forces, which controlled 
the routes, and a war economy emerged around oil trade,162 which was further 
reported to have reached buyers in Iraq and Turkey.163  
Money earned from these activities has directly financed the warring parties and 
prolonged the conflict, and the role of intermediaries and middlemen was integral to 
this process. The Qaterji brothers were the most prominent figures attracting 
international attention leading to their placement on the EU and U.S. sanction lists.164 
The arrangement continued until 2019 when the U.S. campaign to cut oil supplies to 
the Syrian government was able to pressure the SDF to significantly reduce and at 
times cease selling oil to the Syrian government.165 This led to repeated oil shortages 
in government-held areas.166 In response, the Syrian Government and its allies 
attempted to gain control over one of the oil fields, which unfolded in an incident that 
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involved the U.S. and Russian forces in Syria threatening to further complicate the 
conflict.167 Soon afterward, the US announced that it was staying in Syria for the oil 
and an American company signed a deal with the Kurdish-dominated SDF militias to 
develop and export Syria’s oil,168 a deal that was dubbed illegal by the Syrian 
government.169  
As a consequence, government-controlled areas have become dependent on fuel 
and oil imports from Iran and Russia, oil procured through offshores companies in 
Lebanon and the UAE170 as well as smuggled oil from Lebanon.171 However, U.S. 
sanctions on Iran, as well as shipping and insurance companies that may supply 
Syria, and the crisis in Lebanon have culminated in severe shortages within the 
country. This was further compounded by a series of attacks by Israel on Syria-bound 
oil tankers.172 In addition to weakening the whole economy, 173  these fuel shortages 
have had a direct impact on the agricultural sector across the country as farming 
has become more expensive leading farmers to abandon their lands or increase their 
prices. Food prices further increased due to increased transportation costs and 
production costs, such as electricity generation, another sector under sanctions, and 
water-pumping costs. Continuation of these measures, which are meant to pressure 
the Syrian government, will further stifle any meaningful recovery or the revival of the 
agriculture sector contributing further to the prevailing food insecurity in the country.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The conflict in Syria has been ongoing for a decade and although mass violence is 
no longer in the news, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated to unprecedented 
levels, and the country is in the midst of an ever-worsening humanitarian crisis. The 
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threat of hunger and deprivation looms over the weary population and severe food 
insecurity and the potential for a famine are among the most salient characteristics 
of the current crisis. This is not exclusively an outcome of the conflict or the 
deteriorating economy. Politically motivated policies and interventions created 
some of the worst episodes of humanitarian crises and continue to contribute to the 
current one.  The weaponization of food, aid obstruction, destruction of agricultural 
infrastructure and crops, environmental degradation resulting from war economy 
activities, and international prohibitions and sectoral sanctions against the country 
are all politically motivated interventions, and had a different course of action been 
pursued, the outcome may have been significantly different, and the worst could 
have been avoided.   
Admittedly, none of these policies can singularly be said to directly cause food 
insecurity, and hence the actor behind it, be it national or international, could argue 
against claims of culpability. However, the confluence of these policies and their 
continuation over time is threatening to further push the country into worse 
conditions. Any meaningful efforts to change the current realities will require all 
actors, national and international, to pursue different policies that prioritize the 
interests of civilians and depoliticize access to food. This includes, but is not limited 
to, the provision of unhindered access to aid agencies, an end to targeting 
agriculture, as well as harmonized and increased efforts to assist the recovery of the 
agricultural sector across the country, and an end to international sectoral sanctions 
and prohibitions.  
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